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Since China adopted its “going out” policy in 2001, her outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) flows have grown rapidly, reaching US$84 billion in 2012 
(although the stock remains small). That year, China was the world’s third largest 
outward investor (after the US and Japan).  This performance raises all sorts of issues, 
especially because state-owned enterprises (SOEs) control some three-quarters of the 
country’s OFDI stock. Three challenges are addressed in this Perspective. 
 
A short-term challenge for China’s government is to consider what to do regarding 
the growing skepticism in some host countries about the country’s OFDI. It is 
motivated partly by the usual difficulty of accommodating new competitors, concerns 
about national security (in light of the role of SOEs in the country’s OFDI) and 
concerns about the impact of Chinese OFDI projects (even though this impact may 
not be that different from that of firms from other countries).1 In some developing 
countries – especially where natural resources FDI dominates, as in Africa and Latin 
America – Chinese firms risk being seen as representing a new form of neo-
colonialism in the context of a South-South center-periphery relationship.2 
 
Addressing these concerns requires that China formulate and enforce a “going in” 
strategy to complement its “going out” policy. Part of this strategy requires paying 
considerably more attention to the promotion of sustainable FDI, i.e., FDI that 
contributes as much as possible to the economic, social and environmental 
development of host countries and takes place in the context of fair governance 
(including contracts in natural resources FDI).3 One possibility would be for China to 
take the lead in establishing an independent facility to help especially the least 
developed countries negotiate large-scale contracts with firms from any country, 
including in natural resources. 
 
A medium-term challenge is to see how China responds to efforts by some developed 
countries to discipline (e.g., in the context of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
negotiations) the support (e.g., financial and fiscal incentives) that governments give 
to their SOEs investing abroad. This issue is particularly important for China, given 
its elaborate set of home country measures that supports Chinese firms going abroad. 
 2
However, China is not alone in rendering such support – most developed countries 
and a few emerging markets do the same, including for firms in the private sector.4  
 
One way to deal with this challenge is to extend the discussions and negotiations of 
this subject to all measures available to firms investing abroad, regardless of whether 
they are government-owned, in the interest of full competitive neutrality. However, 
since home country measures in some sense mirror incentives to attract FDI, and 
efforts in the past to discipline the latter have come to naught, disciplining OFDI 
incentives will be a challenging endeavor. 
 
Finally, a long-term challenge is for China to determine what role she wants to play in 
constructing a multilateral framework for investment. Given that direct investments of 
Chinese firms often face host country resistance – which may well intensify as 
China’s OFDI grows – it is in China’s interest that multilateral rules that enshrine a 
proper balance between protecting FDI and leaving sufficient policy space for 
governments to pursue legitimate public policy objectives are in place. With the rise 
of China as an investor, its interests as a host country to protect its policy space have 
increasingly been complemented by its interests as a home country to protect the 
investments of its firms abroad, reflected in the evolution of its international 
investment agreements. In fact, if one wanted to pinpoint the precise date at which 
China’s home country interests became equal to, or more important than, its host 
country interests, one might point to July 11, 2013, when China agreed, in the context 
of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, to continue negotiations of an 
investment treaty with the US on the basis of pre-establishment national treatment and 
the negative list approach to exceptions to such treatment.5 This conceptual and policy 
breakthrough could lay the ground not only for an agreement between the two 
countries, but also for a broader investment framework. 
 
China did not participate in the creation of the world’s financial and trade 
frameworks. If and when this issue reaches the international agenda again, it has the 
opportunity to participate actively in the process of creating a multilateral investment 
framework, perhaps even taking the lead in this process. 
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